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activity on the part of any of them. They have merely sought 
to stand on their constitutional right to take the one and only 
oath which the Constitution prescribed. On this stand I un-
qualifiedly join them. 
I would, therefore, grant the writ prayed for and restore 
petitioner to his position. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied No-
vember 14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22035. In Bank. Oct. 17, 1952.] 
JUNE HIRSCHMAN et al., .Appellants, v. COUNTY OF 
LOS .ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Employees-Oath-Form.-A county civil service em-
ployee may properly be directed by the board of supervisors 
to swear that he is not, and since December 7, 1941, has not 
been, a member of any organization which advocates the over-
throw of the government by force, except those which he may 
list, including those specifically named if they should ever 
be determined by a court of law to advocate such overthrow, 
since such direction, when properly construed, requires him 
to designate only those of the named organizations which he 
knows advocates overthrow of the government by force, or 
which to his knowledge has been held by a court to advocate 
such action. 
[2] !d.-Oath-Persons Included.-Gov. Code, § 1360 et seq., re-
quiring all officers to take the constitutional oath, did not 
apply to all persons in p-qblic employment, and the field of 
loyalty oath requirements for all persons in county service 
was not preempted by statute until the adoption of the Lever-
ing Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109) which expressly requires 
all county employees to take the oath prescribed therein. 
(Opinion on denial of rehearing.) 
.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
.Angeles County. W. Turney Fox, Judge. .Affirmed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Public Officers, §52; Am.Jur., Public Officers, 
§ 7. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Public Employees. 
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Proceeding in mandamus to compel county civil service 
commission to set aside its decision upholding discharge of 
county employees for failure to sign an oath of office. Judg-
ment denying writ affirmed. 
Margolis & McTernan, John T. McTernan, William B. 
Murrish, Wirin, Rissman & Okrand, A. L. Wirin, Fred Ok-
rand and Nanette Dembitz for Appellants. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Gerald G. Kelly, 
Assistant County Counsel, and Robert L. Trapp, Deputy 
County Counsel, for Respondents. 
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiffs, permanent civil service em-
ployees of the county of JJOS Angeles, were discharged be-
cause they refused to execute the oath and affidavits prescribed 
by orders of the county board of supervisors made in 1947 
and 1948. * The county civil service commission sustained 
the discharges after a hearing upon stipulated facts, and plain-
tiffs sought a writ of mandate in the superior court to compel 
their reinstatement and the payment of wages retroactive to 
the date of discharge. This appeal was taken from the judg-
ment denying the requested relief. 
The oath and affidavits are as follows: 
''A. OATH OF OI<'l"ICE OR EJ\fPLOYJ\fENT 
"I, ____ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
and. the Constitution and laws of the State of California, 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true 
faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation 
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; 
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of 
the office or employment on which I am about to enter or am 
nOW eugaged. SO HELP ME GOD. 
"B. AFFIDAVIT RE SuBVERSIVE AcTIVITY 
"I do further swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor 
am I now a member, nor have I been since December 7, 1941, 
•·The oath and affidavits as originally adopted in August, 1947, were 
upheld by the District Court of Appeal in Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. 
App.2d 481 [199 P.2d 429]. On December 5, 1949, under the title of 
Parker v. Los Angeles County, 338 U.S. 327 [70 S.Ot. 161, 94 L.Ed. 144], 
writs of certiorari were dismissed by the United States Supreme Court on 
the ground that the federal questions presented were ''not ripe for 
decision. ' ' 
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a member of any political party or organization that advo" 
cates the overthrow of the Government of the United States 
or State of California, or County of Los Angeles, by force or 
violence, except those specified as follows : --------
(the organizations here to be listed embrace all organizations 
advocating the overthrow of government by force or violence 
including any of the hereinafter named if they should ever 
be determined by a court of law to advocate the overthrow 
of government by force or violence) ; and that during such 
time as I am an officer or employee of the County of Los An-
geles, I will not ad vocate nor become a member of any political 
party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the 
Government of the United States, or State of California, or 
County of Los Angeles, by force or violence. 
'' C. AFFIDAVIT RE ALIASES 
"I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never used 
or been known by any names other than those listed as 
follows: 
''D. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS 
"I do further swear (or affirm) that I have never been a 
member of, or directly or indirectly supported or followed 
any of the hereinafter listed organizations, except those that I 
indicate by an X mark." [Next follows a list of 142 organi-
zations which were selected from those mentioned in one or 
more of the reports of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee of 
the California Legislature on Un-American Activities in 
California.] 
All of the facts pertinent to this case were stipulated to by 
the parties when the matter was before the county civil serv-
ice commission. It appears that plaintiffs were given an op-
portunity to take the oath and make the affidavits but did not 
do so. '!'hereafter, on April 27, 1948, the board of supervisors 
ordered all department heads to direct the employees under 
them to execute the oath and affidavits immediately. Plain-
tiffs were advised of this order and were informed that refusal 
to comply would be considered insubordination. On or about 
May 5th plaintiffs refused to obey the order on the ground 
that the oath and affidavits were unconstitutional. 
On July 20th a new order was adopted by the supervisors 
which provided as follows: '' ( 1) 'fhat unless the employee 
executes parts A, B and C of the oath and affidavit attached 
hereto and made a part of this order, by 5:00P.M. on the 26th 
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day of July, 1948, that the department head will discharge 
such employee at that time. (2) That if the employees re-
fuse on the 26th day of July, 1948, to execute paragraph D 
of said oath and affidavit they will be discharged for such 
refusal if and when the loyalty test litigation now pending 
is :finally concluded with a determination that the County was 
justified in requiring from its employees the information em-
bodied in paragraph D." Thereupon plaintiffs were directed 
by the heads of their departments to execute ''parts A, B and 
C of said oath and affidavit," and they refused to take "the 
oath and affidavit or parts A, Band C" within the prescribed 
time. Plaintiffs were notified that they were discharged as of 
July 26th on the ground of insubordination because of refusal 
to execute the oath and affidavits in full on May 5th, and re-
fusal to execute parts A, B and C pursuant to the order of 
July 20th. 
The civil service commission held a hearing to review the 
discharges, and on November 23, 1948, it found and concluded 
that plaintiffs' "failure to sign the Loyalty Oath and Para-
graphs A, B, and C of the Affidavit, after having been ordered 
to do,'' justified their dismissals for insubordination. The 
decision of the commission makes no reference to paragraph 
D or to plaintiffs' failure to take the oath and make all of the 
affidavits as directed by the supervisors in their order of April 
27, 1948. As noted above, the board's order of ,July 20, 1948, 
provided that employees who refused to execute part D "will 
be discharged for such refusal if and when the loyalty test 
litigation now pending is finally concluded with a determina-
tion that the County was justified in requiring from its em-
ployees the information embodied in paragraph D." The 
"pending" litigation referred to by the supervisors (Steiner 
v. Darby, 88 Cal.App.2d 481 [199 P.2d 429]) was not finally 
concluded when the civil service commission rendered its de-
cision sustaining the discharges. Therefore, under the terms 
of the board's order, the commission could not properly con-
sider plaintiffs' failure to execute part D as a ground for dis-
missal, and the commission's decision shows that it was based 
on and restricted to plaintiffs' refusal to execute paragraphs 
A, B and C. The trial court concluded .that plaintiffs' refusal 
to execute parts A, B and C constituted insubordination and 
sufficient cause for discharge, and in view of the commission's 
decision we may disregard the further conclusion of the trial 
court that plaintiffs' earlier refusal to execute paragraphs 
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A, B, C and D likewise furnished sufficient cause for dis-
missal. It follows that we need not pass upon the issues raised 
with respect to part D, and inasmuch as plaintiffs stipulate 
that they do not have, and never did have, any objection 
to paragraphs A and C, the validity of paragraph B is all 
that remains to be considered. 
Substantially the same provisions as appear in paragraph 
B are to be found in the oath prescribed by the Levering Act 
(Gov. Code, §§ 3100-3109), the validity of which was upheld 
in Packman v. Leona1·d, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267] .* 
There is only one difference between the two which requires 
discussion. [1] The employee is directed by paragraph B 
to swear that he is not, and since December 7, 1941, has not 
been, a member of an organization which advocates the over-
throw of the government by force, except those which he lists 
in a space provided for that purpose, and immediately under 
this space appears the following: '' (the organizations here to 
be listed embrace all organizations advocating the overthrow 
of government by force or violence including any of the here-
inafter named if they should ever be determined by a court 
of law to advocate the o:verthrow of government by force 
or violence).'' 'l'he ''hereinafter named'' organizations re-
ferred to are those listed in paragraph D, and the county 
concedes that each employee was expected merely to fill out 
the form in accordance with his information on the date that 
he executed the document. The quoted language, when prop-
erly construed, required plaintiffs to designate only those of 
the named organizations which they knew advocated over-
throw of the government by force, or which to their knowl-
edge had been held by a court to advocate such action. They 
were not required to speculate upon what the courts might 
determine in the future. As thus interpreted, the require-
ment was sufficiently certain to be understood and applied, 
and it must be sustained under our decision in Packman v. 
Leonard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267], that public em-
ployees may properly be required to furnish information re-
garding their memberships in organizations which, to their 
*The Levering Act did not go into effect until after plaintiffs were 
discharged, and the question of its operation is not involved here. It 
may be noted, however, that the oath and affidavits which are before us 
in the present case cannot now be properly required by the county, since 
the Levering Act has fully occupied the field of legislation on the subject 
of loyalty oaths for public employees in California. (Bowen v. County 
of Los Angeles, post, p. 714 [249 P.2d 285]; cf. Fraser v. Regents 
of University of California, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283].) 
Oct.1952] HmscHMAN v. CouNTY OF Los ANGELES 
[39 C.2d 698; 249 P.2d 287] 
703' 
knowledge, have advocated the overthrow of the government 
by force and violence. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pock-
man v. Leonard, this clay filed, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267], 
I would reverse the judgment with directions to the trial court 
to issue a writ of mandate in accordance with the prayer of 
plaintiffs' complaint. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
14, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
The following opinion was then rendered: 
THE COURT.-[2] In their petition for rehearing plain-
tiffs, who are civil service employees of Los Angeles County, 
claim that the county oath should be invalidated on the 
ground that the field of loyalty oath requirements for all 
public employees had been fully occupied by sections 1360 
et seq. of the Government Code which provide that every 
officer shall take the constitutional oath before entering upon 
the duties of his office. The term "officer" as used therein 
clearly includes both state and county officers (see § 1363 (b)), 
but the provisions requiring execution of the oath do not 
mention employees and cannot reasonably be read as applying 
to all persons in public employment. That the Legislature 
had no such intent was made clear by the enactment of Gov-
ernment Code, sections 18150 et seq., which specifically extend 
the oath requirement to all state employees. These latter 
sections would obviously have been unnecessary and mean-
ingless if sections 1360 et seq. were construed as petitioners 
urge. 
There is nothing in Tolman v. Underhill, post, p. 708 
[249 P.2d 280], which is inconsistent with our interpretation 
of sections 1360-1363 of the Government Code, since the case 
does not hold that those provisions, standing alone, require 
all public employees to take the prescribed oath. The opinion 
proceeds on the theory that sections 1360-1363 and 18150, 
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must be read together in order to cover all persons in sta.te 
service, both officers and employees. 
Nor is any different interpretation of sections 1360-1363 
required by reason of our holding in Packman v. Leonard, 
ante, p. 676, 683-684 [249 P.2d 267], that all persons 
in public employment are protected by the constitutional pro-
hibition against the imposition of religious or political tests 
as a qualification for ''any office or public trust.'' Our con-
struction of the language of the prohibition as running in 
favor of all public employees does not constitute a holding 
that all such persons must execute the constitutional oath and 
obviously does not compel us to interpret the term "officer" in 
section 1360 as applying to all persons in public employment. 
Government Code, sections 18150 et seq., clearly have no 
application to persons employed by a county, and under 
Government Code, sections 1360-1363, the only persons in 
county service who are required to take the constitutional oath 
are officers. The field of loyalty oath requirements for all 
persons in county service was not preempted by statute until 
the adoption of the Levering Act which expressly requires all 
county employees to take the oath prescribed therein. (See 
Bowen v. County of Los Angeles, post, p. 714, 715-716 [249 
P.2d 285].) 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
C~RTER, J.-Dissenting. 
I agree with petitioners that the holdings in the so-called 
loyalty oath cases are inconsistent and irreconcilable, and 
it seems to me that the supplemental opinion this day filed 
does not clarify but adds to the confusion which is the 
inevitable result of an attempt to reach a certain conclusion 
without pursuing a course of logical reasoning. 
Government Code, section 1360, sets forth an oath identical 
with that prescribed in section 3, articl.e XX, of the Con-
stitution. Section 1360(3) provides that the oath applies to 
"officers elected or appointed for any county." In Packman v. 
Leonard, ante, p. 676, 684 [249 P.2d 267], it was held 
that the word "officers" in section 3 of the Constitution 
applied to "every state and local officer and employee" and 
that such persons could not be required to take any oath 
but that set forth in the Constitution or one substantially 
identical thereto. Petitioners argue that the word "officer" 
in section 1363 ( 3) should be given a similar interpretation 
and that they, as county employees, were required to take 
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the oath set forth in section 1360 and that, as in Tolman v. 
Underhill, post, p. 708 [249 P.2d 280], the Legislature 
had preempted the field so as to invalidate the county oath. 
In the Tolman case, post, pp. 708, 712, the court said 
that "Although the adoption of local rules supplementary 
to state law is proper under some circumstances, it is well 
settled that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to 
impose additional requirements in a field which is fully 
occupied by statute (citations) ... " and "As we have 
already seen, the Legislature has enacted a general and de-
tailed scheme requiring all state employees to execute a pre-
scribed oath relating to loyalty and faithful performance of 
duty, and it could not have intended that they must at the 
same time remain subject to any such additional loyalty oaths 
or declarations as the particular agency employing them might 
see fit to impose. Multiplicity and duplication of oaths and 
dedarations would not only reflect seriously upon the digm"ty 
of state employment but would make a travesty of the effort to 
secure loyal and suitable persons for government service." 
This court now, after holding in Packman v. Leonard, 
supra, that the word "officers" in the Constitution applies 
to every state and local officer and employee, seeks to dis-
tinguish this case on the ground that section 1363 (b) cannot 
''reasonably be read as applying to all persons in public 
employment. That the Legislature had no such intent was 
made clear by the enactment of Government Code section 
18150 et seq., which specifically extend the oath requirement 
to all state employees." It is also said that Tolman v. Under-
hilT, supra, is not inconsistent with the interpretation given 
sections 1360-1363 of the Government Code, "since the case 
does not hold that those provisions, standing alone, require all 
public employees to take the prescribed oath. The opinion 
proceeded on the theory that sections 1360-1363 and 18150 
et seq. must be read together in order to cover all persons 
in state service, both officers and employees." It appears to 
me that the argument used here is inconsistent with the 
statement in Packman v. Leonard. Why should the word 
''officers'' be given a different interpretation in construing 
the Constitution from that given it in construing section 1360 
et seq. of the Government Code ? Article 4 of title 1, of the 
Government Code is entitled "Oath of Office" (not "Oath of 
Office" for county officers) and chapter 4, title 2, is entitled 
39 C.2d-23 
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"Oaths for State Employees." But the latter provision re-
lates back to .Article 4 for the ''Method and manner of taking, 
subscribing, and filing oath: Nonmember of civil service" 
(see section 18152). Both section 1360 (which is said to 
apply to county officers only) and section 18150 provide that 
the affiant will faithfully discharge ''the office of --" to 
the best of his ability; yet one is said to relate to officers only 
and the other to employees and that one may not include 
the other . 
.As the majority of the court said in Packman v. Leonard, 
supra, "We are unable to find any place where a line can 
reasonably be drawn so as to place some positions within 
and others outside the constitutional prohibition, and, in our 
opinion, there is no justification for excluding any public 
servants from its protection. The prohibition should therefore 
be rrmd as applying to every state and local officer and 
employee. This construction is in accord with the basic 
purpose of safeguarding the public and its servants by for-
bidding oaths and declarations regarding matters that bear 
no reasonable relationship to governmental service and par-
ticulculy those that involve political and religious beliefs. 
Persons in the lower levels of government are just as much 
entitled to this protection as those in higher positions.'' 
(Emphasis ours.) The supplemental opinion states that 
Packman v. Leonard, supra, holds that all persons in public 
employment are ptotected by the constitutional prohibition 
against ''the imposition of religious or political tests as a 
qualification for 'any office or public trust.' " The oath there 
was specifically held not to constitute either a religious or 
politiral test. I am of the opinion that the holding in the 
Pockman case goes farther than the court now decides that 
it went. It is my understanding that the word "officers" 
there was held to include all employees, but that the oath 
involved in that case did not substantially differ from the 
constitutional oath. I am of the opinion now, as I was then 
(see dissent, Packman v. Leonard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 
267] ) , that if there is no difference between the two, then 
the Levering .Act is a nullity. 
In the Tolman case it was held that the state Legislature 
had expressly provided that the constitutional oath was 
required of every state employee and, "by a series of statutes, 
has enacted a general and comprehensive scheme relating to 
execution and filing of the oath by all such persons'' and 
that "Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing 
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a pa1·ticular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupy-
ing the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not 
to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole 
purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.'' What was said 
in the Tolman case with respect to legislative preemption 
of th8 field is as applicable to county employees as it was 
to state employees and it is my opinion that they may be 
required to take only the constitutional oath which is set 
forth in sections 1360 et seq. of the Government Code to-
gether with the method and manner of taking the same. There 
is no merit to the argument that the constitutional oath pro-
vision is not self-executing; the Legislature has provided that 
the oath there set forth shall be taken and the manner in 
which it is to be done in that article of the Government 
Code ( 4) entitled "Oath of Office." Therefore, if the Legis-
lature did not preempt the field by the last mentioned statutes, 
it certainly did not do so by the Levering Act. Furthermore, 
if the Legislature could not prescribe any other oath than 
that set forth in section 3 of article XX of the Constitution, 
such restriction should apply to all other legislative bodies 
in the state, and thus render the oath here involved invalid. 
I would therefore grant a rehearing in this and all com-
panion cases. 
